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International Paretianism: A Defense
Eric A. Posner* and David Weisbacht

Abstract
A treaty satisfes what we call InternationalParetianism(P) if it advances the interests
of all states thatjoin it, so that no state is made worse off The prinafle might seem obvious,
but it rules out nearly all the majorproposalsfora climate treaty, includingproposals advanced
by academics and by government officials. We defend IP, andfor that reason urge commentators
in the debate over climatejustice to abandon efforts to rightpast wrongs, redistribute wealth,
and achieve other abstractideals through a climate treaty. Instead, the goal should be to develop
afeasible treaty that states willjoin because they expect to gainfrom it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Climate Changejustice,' we argued that a viable climate treaty must comply
with International Paretianism (IP), the principle that at least one state must
benefit from the treaty and no state party will be made worse off by the treaty. A
number of critics of our arguments appear to assume that we intended IP as an
ethical principle.2 In fact, IP is not an ethical principle but a feasibility constraint.3
Our claim is that it is idle to argue for a climate treaty on ethical grounds if the
ethically required climate treaty will surely be rejected. The challenge for
commentators and scholars ought to be to propose a climate treaty that is both
ethically acceptable and politically feasible. However, there has been very little
discussion of political feasibility. The focus on ethics alone has resulted in
numerous proposals that have little chance of being accepted. Pursuit of these
proposals has resulted in little progress in reducing emissions. The world would
be better served, and a more ethical outcome achieved, if the focus were instead
on feasible treaties that actually reduce emissions.
In Climate Change justice we did not provide a full defense of lP. That lacuna
may account for some of the criticisms we have received. Some commentators
argue that IP is indefensible because it blocks ethically obligatory treaties and
favors rich countries like the US. Accordingly, our use of IP confuses the "is"
with the "ought." Another criticism is that IP, as we define it, is incoherent
because it defines a state's interest to include a state's moral obligations, in which
case IP cannot serve as an independent constraint. A third criticism, which we
have not (yet) heard but which we believe should be addressed, is that IP, if
taken to its logical conclusion, implies that states never act ethically, in which
case debate about the ethics of climate change is idle.
In this Article, we respond to these criticisms. After explaining what IP
means, we make three major points. First, participants in the climate debate
should advocate treaties that are not only ethical but also feasible. Second, IP is a
reasonable approximation of feasibility, although there may be other principles
that better capture what is feasible. Third, IP does not necessarily imply that

I
2

3

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice (Princeton 2010).
See, for example, Dale Jamieson, Consequentialsm, Climate Change, and the Road Ahead, 13 Chi J Intl
L 439, 454-55 (2013).
IP could be defended as an ethical principle, based on a strong empirical assumption that moral
progress would most likely occur in a world with a strong state system in which states enjoy
complete autonomy, and even more so if national sovereignty has intrinsic value. We do not think
this view is implausible, but we do not defend it here. For a discussion of the implications of the
view that national sovereignty has intrinsic value, see Martha Nussbaum, Climate Change: Why
Theories ofjusice Matter, 13 Chi J Intl L 469, 479-82 (2013).
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states never act ethically, but instead helps focus the ethical debate on realistic
alternatives.
II. WHAT IS IP AND WHY ADOPT IT?
The Pareto principle in economics is an ethical standard that provides that
a project is socially desirable if it makes at least one person better off than in the
status quo and makes no person worse off. Most economists and, as far as we
know, philosophers, believe that the Pareto principle is a sufficient condition for
social desirability, at least if one accepts the broadly welfarist assumptions of
economics and modern public policy, and defines well-being properly. However,
nearly everyone agrees that the Pareto principle is too strong: it bars projects
that may be socially desirable, like a vaccine that will help thousands but cause
minor injuries to a few people who cannot be adequately compensated (perhaps
because they cannot be identified).
Although we borrow Vilfredo Pareto's name for IP, we do not classify it as
an ethical principle. IP is satisfied for an international project, such as a treaty,
that makes at least one state that joins the project better off than in the status
quo, while harming no other states. Buried in this definition are a number of
assumptions. First, states will act so as to advance their self-interest. Second, a
state's self-interest is its perceived self-interest, not an "objective" self-interest.4
Third, a state's self-interest can include ethical interests, but whether it does is an
empirical question and ethical interests may vary by state.s
IP differs from the Pareto principle because a project that makes a state
better off might make some citizens of the state worse off. If a state defines its
national interest in a way that takes account of the well-being of few of its
citizens, it may enter a treaty that complies with IP but that has extremely bad
consequences for many people. That is why IP is not even a weak ethical
principle, unlike the Pareto principle.
What is the point of IP if it is not an ethical principle? It is a feasibility
constraint. It is a device to discipline our thinking to ensure that our
recommendations can actually be implemented.
Another term one could use to describe IP is "participation constraint."
This term is frequently used in the economics literature as a condition of a
"mechanism" that is designed to elicit information from people for (usually)

4

Compare with Jamieson, 13 Chi J Intl L at 454-55 (cited in note 2) (asking whether we mean IP
as subjective or objective).

5

Id at 456 (implying that we intended IP as an axiom, whereas in fact we treat it as an empirical
assumption).
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socially desirable ends.' The economics literature focuses a great deal of energy
discussing "second-best" projects that make people better off than in the status
quo but are not first-best in the sense that without constraints people could be
even better off. These projects are desirable, but not perfect, because the
theoretically perfect projects are inconsistent with people's incentives; that is,
people will not participate in them and hence (in our words) they are not
feasible.
To use a standard example from economics, a government policy in which
people are told to voluntarily reveal their income and asked to pay taxes on the
basis of it, while not being subject to audits or sanctions if they fail to do so,
violates the participation constraint because people would have no incentive to
comply with the policy. They would instead conceal their income. A tax policy
that complies with participation constraints must make people at least as well off
if they comply with the policy as if they cheat. Such a policy is the ethically
preferred policy even though it is inferior to the policy of voluntary compliance
in a world in which participation constraints were assumed away. Thus, the
economic literature focuses on the set of feasible policies, and attempts to
determine the best policy within that feasible set.
Philosophers also use feasibility constraints in considering the appropriate
structure of political institutions. For example, John Rawls, in PoliticalLiberalism,
argues that a conception of justice must be realistic in that it must be capable of
forming the basis of a stable society.! A stable society is one that is "willingly and
freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active
citizens."' Similarly, Thomas Nagel argues that "the motivations that are morally
required of us must be practically and psychologically possible, otherwise our
political theory will be utopian in the bad sense."' How tight these constraints
are assumed to be-how much of human nature and which political institutions
are taken as given-varies widely in the philosophical literature.o

6

See Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theog of Incentives: The Princpal-AgentModel 30
(Princeton 2002).

7

John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edion 450-57 (Columbia 2d ed 2005).
Id at 38. Rawls also explained that an account of justice is realistic for democratic regimes only if
"under the best of foreseeable conditions" it can be supported by an overlapping consensus
without the use of oppressive state power. Id at xvii.

8

9

10

Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflct and PolicalLgimay, 16 Phil & Pub Aff 215, 218 (1987).
See Thomas Nagel, Equaty and Parfiaty 4-24 (Oxford 1995); John Dunn, Interpreting Polical
Responsibidly: Essays 1981-1989 193-215 (Princeton 1990); Brian Barry, Jusice as Impartiakly

(Oxford 1996). See also Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying This May Be True in Theof But It
Does Not Apply in Practice, in Maurice Cowling, et al, eds, Kant's Poiical W'ridngs 61, 89 (Cambridge
1977); G.A. Cohen, Facts and Pnnafples, 31 Phil & Pub Aff 211, 244 (2003).

350

Vol. 13 No. 2

Posnerand Weisbach

InternaionalParedanism

A recent book by Elizabeth Anderson on racial discrimination provides
another example of the use of feasibility constraints by philosophers. She points
out that ideal theory can blind one to proposals that improve society when those
proposals would not lead to an ideal outcome." Suppose, for example, that ideal
theory dictates that society be color-blind, meaning that government may never
condition legal duties and benefits on race. Ideal theory would then block
affirmative action programs. But, Anderson argues, if we start with the world as
it is, and observe that African-Americans experience various disabilities caused
by racism not embodied in the law, we may conclude that affirmative action is
morally justifiable. It violates ideal theory, but is justified as a means for
achieving better outcomes in the non-ideal world.
A similar point can be made about the climate debate. Indeed, proponents
of aggressive climate treaties accept feasibility constraints, but these constraints
are usually implicit and unacknowledged. Consider, for example, the claim that
the right to emissions should be allocated on a per capita basis. The claim is
justified on the intuition that common resources belong equally to everyone.
Proponents of this view do not argue that all resources (such as natural
resources within the territory of a state) should be distributed, even though the
logic of their argument does not limit equal sharing to resources that happen to
lie outside of states' territories. We suspect the reason they do not make this
argument is that they accept an implicit feasibility constraint that states would
not agree to share resources located on their territory, whatever the ethical
merits of sharing. But proponents of an equal per capita emissions allocation do
not explain why their proposal is feasible when equal per capita allocation of all
resources is not.1 In fact, equal per capita allocation of emissions is no more
feasible than equal allocation of other resources, which is why it is not fruitful to
spend time advocating either proposal. Explicit acknowledgement of feasibility
constraints would make this evident.
Failure to acknowledge and defend feasibility assumptions is a common
problem in writing about international relations. While commentators frequently
rule out world government as an institutional solution to problems they identify,
presumably on feasibility grounds, they endorse laws and institutional
arrangements that are hardly less ambitious without explaining how they are
feasible if world government is not, or in any way clarifying their assumptions
about what is possible. These proposals include international federations, a
democratic United Nations, strong permanent courts with the power to compel
nations to comply with their judgments, rights to democratic participation that
11 Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperaive ofIntegration 3-7 (Princeton 2010).
12

See, for example, Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Uneqaal World: A Care of

EnvironmentalColoniaksm (Centre for Science and Environment 1991).
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would apply to all countries in the world, other strong rights such as rights to
welfare and health care, which are respected in virtually no country outside
Europe, and massive transfers of wealth from rich countries to poor countries."
This is not to deny that states have created some important international
institutions that have done some good, that aspirational statements may have
value, or that norms of behavior may change. There is room for imaginative
scholarship that considers these possibilities. But discussions aimed at creating
institutions in the immediate future, such as an international climate regime,
need to be particularly sensitive to feasibility. Far-reaching aspirations will have
little effect and may in fact reduce the likelihood of reaching agreement to the
extent energy is wasted on efforts to reach a goal that is not within the bounds
of feasibility.14 Focus on ethically appealing but infeasible proposals is, we
believe, one of the reasons for the failure of climate negotiations so far. Given
the urgency of reducing emissions, this is troubling. It is more ethical to have
hard-headed negotiators focused on reaching an agreement that is enforceable
and actually reduces emissions than to spend time trying to reach impossible
goals while emissions continue to increase.
The challenge is to develop criteria to distinguish the institutions that are
feasible from those that are not, and then to limit serious policy discussion to
the former. The balance is not easy. An approach that included no limits, such as
an approach that denied the existence of states or assumed transfers from
wealthy states to poor states orders of magnitude larger than we have ever seen,
is not helpful. An approach that includes no room for ethical considerations
leaves nothing to discuss. We propose IP as an appropriate criterion that is
located on middle ground.
IP is a more complex idea than the participation constraint used in
economics. In standard economic models, authors assume that people want to
satisfy their preferences, and typically this assumption boils down to a tractable
claim that people want more money rather than less money. The assumption is
obviously simplistic, but it may be serviceable enough in many policy contexts,
for example, regarding payment of taxes or contributions to public goods.
State interests are far more complex because they are constructed from
some aggregation of the interests of the people who control the state. Common
experience tells us that states frequently seek to increase national wealth, but that
they do not always do so. For example, states may adopt trade policies that favor
certain groups (say, firms that compete with importers) to other groups
13

14

See, for example, Peter Singer, One World. The Ethics of Globadtation (Yale 2002); Thomas W.
Pogge, World Povertj and Human Rghts (Polity 2d ed 2008); Larry May, Globaljusice and Due Process
(Cambridge 2011).
See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Changejusice at 71-72 (cited in note 1).
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(consumers and exporters), which reduce rather than increase national wealth or
well-being, as measured by GDP or other more sophisticated measures. In
addition, states will often adopt policy goals that are, or at least appear to be,
based on ethical considerations. For example, Western nations rejected the
international slave trade in the nineteenth century. Today, many countries claim
that human rights constrain their policy choices.
Still, any reasonable survey of international law and institutions suggests
that a relatively straightforward account of states' interests goes a long way to
explaining what we observe and what we do not observe." The vast majority of
treaties involve humdrum day-to-day things: extradition, taxation, maintaining
embassies, and protecting foreigners and their property. A number of
multilateral treaties set communication standards, provide for trade, and
establish fisheries. There are also arms control agreements, base agreements,
overflight agreements, and much else. All of these treaties are the result of
negotiations between governments trying to obtain particular benefits for their
citizens through mutual exchange. While no doubt some governments make
mistakes and end up with treaties that harm rather than benefit them, even these
treaties can be easily renegotiated, so it would be surprising if the vast majority
of treaties did not comply with IP.
The closest analogy to a climate treaty is the Montreal Protocol." The US
and other major countries agreed to cut back on chlorofluorocarbons in order to
reduce the size of the ozone hole. But the US approached Europe for treaty
negotiations after the US had concluded that even unilateral action would serve
its interest; a treaty would help share the burdens." The Montreal Protocol
almost certainly satisfied IP. The US, in particular, then under the administration
of President Reagan, who was skeptical of environmental activism, pushed for
the Montreal Protocol after concluding that it satisfied a strict cost-benefit
analysis taking account of national interests.19
Then there are the human rights treaties, which might seem inconsistent
with IP. But the empirical literature on human rights treaties suggests that even
they comply with IP. The treaties did not require liberal democracies to change
1s
16

17

See, for example, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Set 171
(1966).
One of us has written extensively on this topic. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The
Limits of InternationalLaw (Oxford 2006); Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (Chicago
2011); Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes, Economic FoundationsofInternationallmaw (Belknap 2013).
See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), 26 ILM 1550 (1989).

19

James Murdoch and Todd Sandler, The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced
CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol, 63 J Pub Econ 331, 347 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kjoto:A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 3 (2008).

19

See Sunstein, 31 Harv Envir L Rev at 5 (cited in note 18).
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their practices in most cases, and where they did, the liberal democracies issued
reservations that excused them from those obligations. Authoritarian states
entered the treaties in return for bribes or in response to threats, and, according
to the empirical research, mostly ignored them. Transitional states seem to be
the only states that have changed their behavior, if the empirical research is to be
believed; but in any event these states entered the treaties because transitional
liberal governments hoped to lock in liberal rights. 20 Thus, the human rights
treaties comply with IP.
Finally, consider the range of international institutions. Most such
institutions are set up to serve certain interests of states-to maintain peace or
enhance trade, for example-while at the same time they are designed so that
states have significant opportunities to protect their interests in case they find
themselves in a minority. For nearly all major international institutions, one or
more of the following propositions is correct: (1) they make policy through
consensus or subject to strict supermajority rules, so nearly all states possess
vetoes (the United Nations,21 the WTO, the Law of the Sea Authority); (2) states
can and do undercut these institutions' powers by stipulating that the states will
be immune to certain of those powers (the International Court of Justice); (3)
the institutions do not possess formal legal authority and so cannot issue binding
rules or orders (the International Labor Standards Organization, the World
Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and other human rights
committees and commissions); (4) they lack enforcement power (all international
institutions); (5) states can opt out of the institution at any time (virtually all
international institutions); (6) states may avail themselves of the benefits
provided by an institution if they wish but are not obliged to (the IMF, the
World Bank); (7) the institution may issue binding orders but states must rely on
self-help for a remedy (the WTO dispute resolution system); and (8) an
institution with apparently strong powers in practice never uses them, uses them
only with the consent of the affected state, or uses them against only the very
weakest states (the International Criminal Court). Thus, nearly all of the
decisions made by these institutions will roughly satisfy IP, as states that object
to them can block them, opt out of them, or otherwise avoid their force.22
20
21

See Beth Simmons, Mobili ingfor Human Rights: InternationalLaw in Domestic Poltics 65 (Cambridge
2009).
The United Nations is the one quasi-exception, in which all countries aside from the five
permanent members of the Security Council have nominally exposed themselves to the risk of
being outvoted and legally bound to an outcome they disapprove of, but the United Nations lacks
any enforcement power.

22

A key exception arises in zero-sum settings, for example, resolution of a trade dispute by the
WTO dispute resolution body, but in these cases the system is plausibly viewed as consistent with
states' ex ante interests.
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It is this historical experience, and not some a prioriaxiom, which underlies
the assumption of IP. Philosophers and others who argue for a climate treaty
that rights past injustices, redistributes to the poor, and achieves other goals that
violate IP bear the burden of explaining why the world's countries would
suddenly change their behavior in such a radical way. They have not carried that
burden.
III. IP AND A CLIMATE TREATY
The implications of IP for a climate treaty are straightforward: the treaty
must be designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the
status quo. A requirement of IP should not be a barrier to the negotiation of a
climate treaty. Scientific evidence strongly suggests that humanity will be worse
off in the future if climate mitigation efforts are not made. Mitigating therefore
creates a surplus relative to the status quo, and this surplus can be distributed
among the states. The surplus will be large enough to compensate even those
states that will not be harmed by climate change (if there are any) and thus
would otherwise be net losers given their treaty obligations. IP has nothing to
say about how this surplus should be distributed; on that question, other
pragmatic or ethical concerns can be brought to bear.
This argument raises a few puzzles. IP rests on the self-interest of states. If
states are self-interested, then they will seek to maximize their gain from a treaty.
But this means that states will not be satisfied with being better off than in the
status quo; rather, states will also seek the largest possible portion of the surplus.
Accordingly, there is no room for any ethical discussion even about the
distribution of the surplus, which will presumably reflect states' relative
bargaining power.
This is a coherent objection to IP, and we do not know whether it is
correct or not. One possible response is that as a matter of political psychology,
voters and other constituents will object to a treaty that makes them worse off
than the status quo, but not to a treaty that makes them less better off than a
feasible alternative but still makes them better off than the status quo. Perhaps
there is some agency slack, and so well-motivated leaders might do the right
thing for the globe once they are satisfied that their own populations will not
punish them.
If the objection is correct, then there is little room for discussion about
fairness. However, even if the objection is correct, a climate treaty will be
desirable. Climate mitigation will occur, climate change will be reduced, and
people around the world will be better off than they would otherwise. The
outcome will not be as fair as other imaginable but infeasible treaties, but it will
be better than the status quo.
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A second puzzle is how we should consider the position of many
developing states (including China) that they will not enter a treaty unless it
redistributes wealth to them,23 for the sake of distributive or corrective justice or
some other conception of justice or fairness. One might argue that those states
conceive their self-interest as requiring the type of redistribution that IP rules
out. To put this more concretely, suppose that the governments are sincere, and
that their populations will refuse to accept a treaty that does not redistribute
wealth to them.
Under our approach, the moral norms that influence the public must be
cashed out in terms of the state's self-interest. And it turns out that there are
only two possibilities. First, suppose the public of, say, India would force the
government to reject any treaty that either imposed positive obligations on India
or failed to fully compensate India for its burdens, or indeed that failed to
redistribute wealth to India beyond any climate benefits. 2 4 If the amount that
India demanded is greater than the surplus generated by the treaty, then a treaty
becomes impossible. It is conceptually little different from a hypothetical treaty
between India and the US under which the US is obligated to pay India $100
billion in return for nothing at all. We do not believe the US would enter such a
treaty, nor, accordingly, a treaty that gave the US $50 billion in climate benefits
at a cost of $150 billion.
Second, suppose that the Indian public would prevent India from ratifying
a treaty that failed to give India a large portion of the surplus but did not fully
deplete it. In that case, the US and other countries would have no choice but to
give India a larger portion of the surplus than they would otherwise. This is
consistent with IP. 25
Note, however, that moral and political arguments that persuade Indians,
Chinese, Brazilians, and other people that they are entitled to a large portion of
the surplus generated by a climate treaty could derail such a treaty. The reason is
that the surplus is finite whereas the amount of money that people might think
appropriate to compensate them for moral harms is potentially unlimited.
Another question is the role that altruism may play in the design of a
climate treaty. As we argue in Climate Change Justice, wealthy states display a

2

24

25

See the proposals collected in Daniel Bodansky, Climate Eforts Beyond 2012: A Surey ofApproaches
(Pew 2004).
As Henry Shue appears to suggest, see Henry Shue, Clmate Hope: Implementing the Exit Strategy, 13
Chi J Intl L 381, 386 (2013).
And so it is theoretically possible that a treaty that satisfied IP would also be distributively fair, as
suggested by Yoram Margalioth, Anasis of the US Case in Climate Change Negotiations, 13 Chi J Intl
L 489, 495-96 (2013). But there is no reason to believe that this is true empirically.
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positive but low degree of altruism toward other states.2 6 For convenience, let us
define the "altruism fund" as the monetized value of the goods, services, or
money that wealthy states are willing to give to poor states solely for the wellbeing of people in those poor states, and not in return for strategic benefits. If
the altruism fund is fixed (in the sense of a percentage of GDP)-that is, it
reflects the exogenous preferences of people living in the wealthy states-then
an efficient climate treaty that mitigated climate effects at least cost, and that
itself has no altruistic component, should nonetheless benefit poor countries
both directly (by reducing climate change) and indirectly (by freeing up money in
the rich states that can be used for altruistic purposes). This should help poor
people more than a climate treaty that benefits poor countries by inefficiently
limiting the obligations of poor countries, and we suspect that it would be fairer
and easier to administer than a climate treaty that included negotiated monetary
transfers from rich to poor, as these would be difficult to change in response to
changing conditions (and may be offset by behavior not banned by the treaty).
Accordingly, we remain convinced that a climate treaty is most likely not a good
way to redistribute wealth.
What of the possibility that the state's interest is endogenous, and that the
state's perceived self-interest could change in response to, for example, moral
argument? This is probably the assumption of commentators who argue that IP
is vacuous.27 Suppose, for example, that American citizens were persuaded that
the US has a moral obligation to bear the bulk of the climate burden because the
US is wealthier than most other states, and because it is responsible for a large
portion of the greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. As noted above, our
conception of IP rules out such a possibility because we believe that states (and
not just the US) define their self-interest in narrower terms, oriented mainly
toward wealth and security. And our conception is based on our reading of
history. We do not expect Americans (or people in other countries) to define
their national interest so capaciously because they never have in the past.
Still, it is possible that people's moral views will change, and that is why we
devoted a fair amount of Climate Change Justice to examining the moral arguments
in play. We concluded that most are not strong even on their own terms. The
corrective justice arguments are not persuasive. Nor are the various equal
sharing arguments grounded in fairness. While there are strong moral arguments

26

27

See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change jusice at 95 (cited in note 1) (claiming that rich nations
already give aid to poor nations, and the amount of aid rendered may reflect a rich nation's
altruistic limit).
See, for example, Paul Baer, Who Should Payfor Climate Change? 'Not Me," 13 Chi J Intl L 507, 521
(2013). Baer also argues that IP assumes the normative legitimacy of the status quo. We disagree;
it merely assumes that we will remain in the status quo unless states agree to change it.
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for redistributing wealth to poor people in poor nations,28 there are immense
practical problems that suggest that foreign aid should be pursued outside of a
climate treaty, if at all. Moreover, even if people accepted these arguments, a
climate treaty that imposed emissions reduction burdens on some countries and
not others based on ethical rather than economic considerations would likely
vastly increase the cost of stabilizing the atmosphere. A treaty that allowed
economic considerations to determine where emissions reductions take place
but that imposed the monetary burdens on a limited set of countries would
simply be a transfer of wealth, which would be unlikely to be accepted by many
countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if Americans were to take seriously the ethical arguments of
philosophers, it seems unlikely that many of them would be persuaded that a
climate treaty should impose disproportionate burdens on the US, and likewise
for people in other rich countries. All of this siggests that if we are to achieve a
climate treaty in the near future, it is time to focus on the real objective of such a
treaty, which is to reduce carbon emissions at an acceptable cost.

2

See, for example, Daniel A. Farber, The Case For Chmate Compensation: Justice for Chmate Change
Vitims in a Complex World, 2008 Utah L Rev 377 (2008) (arguing that developed nations and
especially the US have a moral responsibility to compensate poorer nations); Daniel A. Farber,
Climatejusice, 110 Mich L Rev 985 (2012) (arguing similarly).
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